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Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: 





Do economic sanctions against target countries work as sender countries intend? If so, what 
factors make the positive outcomes possible in economic sanctions? Using quantitative methods with 
the extensive data collection on economic sanctions cases, this study tests a set of hypotheses derived 
from previous research on the topic and from other theories in the field of international relations. The 
empirical analyses of this study provide some new findings that were not revealed through previous 
research on the subject. First, economic sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom were more likely to 
succeed. Second, economic sanctions imposed in response to human rights abuses in target countries 
were less likely to succeed. Finally, the results of this study provide evidence to support the 
“democratic peace theory”: the democratic regime type of the sender nation had a positive impact on 
the success of economic sanctions. 
 





As Bergeijk points out, “[the] end of the Cold War served as a starting point for a true 
proliferation in the use of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy” (1995, 443). 
With this proliferation of economic sanctions, the question of “Do economic sanctions 
work?” has been of increasing interest for both policy makers and researchers in the field of 
international relations. Do economic sanctions against target countries work as sender 
countries intend? If so, what factors make the positive outcomes possible in economic 
sanctions? Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff are correct when they argue that “[although] 
the literature on economic sanctions is voluminous, there is a virtual absence of systemic 
empirical studies of the conditions that render sanctions likely to success” (1997, 608; see 
also Bergejik 1995). As they point out, previous research on this topic has been focused 
primarily on either qualitative case studies or purely theoretical, deductive models.  
This lack of empirical research to test the presumed hypotheses using large Ns is one 
important gap to be filled in the study of economic sanctions. This study attempts to test a set 
of hypotheses with quantitative methods using the extensive data collection on economic 
sanctions cases assembled by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (hereafter HSE, 1985, 1990, 2007). 
This study consists of four parts. First, I review the existing literature on this topic. Second, I 
present the hypotheses to be tested and the operationalization of the variables in my model of 
economic sanctions. Third, I present the essential results revealed from the logistic 
estimation method and the marginal impact analysis. Finally, I summarize the major findings 
and the contribution they make to the existing research on this topic. 
 
 
                                                          
* I thank David L. Rousseau, Timothy J. McKeown, Marco R. Steenbergen, and two anonymous 
reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff points out (1997), the previous literature on 
economic sanctions relied primarily on case studies or formal models. One of the most 
influential examples of research on this topic must be Economic Sanctions Reconsidered by 
HSE. The lack of extensive data collection on sanctions cases posed a serious problem for 
researchers oriented on quantitative analysis using large Ns in the study of economic 
sanctions. Referencing the government documents of both sender and target countries, well-
known sources of economic data, such as the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of 
Trade and International Financial Statistics, and historical reviews, such as Keesing’s 
Contemporary Archives, these three economists have collected data on 20
th
 century sanctions 
cases. For each sanctions case, they list the chronology of key events, goals of sender 
country, response by target country, attitudes of other countries, economic impact of the 
sanctions case, and their assessment of overall success.  
 
[The data from HSE are] surely the most comprehensive and sophisticated data collection on 
sanctions available—indeed, to our knowledge the only existing data base appropriate for 
numeric analysis.... (Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997: 611)  
 
By using the HSE data of 103 sanctions cases, Bergeijk (1989) tests the factors that affect 
the success of economic sanctions. He uses the logistic estimation method with the binary 
dependent variable: he codes 1 if the HSE “success score” in each sanction case equals or 
exceeds 9, otherwise 0. Using five independent variables from HSE (1985) and his own 
“sender reputation” variable measured by the number of the sender’s previous sanctions in a 
period of 10 years, he finds that three of the HSE variables (“pre-sanction relations between 
sender and target,” “sanction length,” and “target conditions”) along with his “sender 
reputation” variable reached statistical significance in his logistic model. Dashti-Gibson, 
Davis, and Radcliff (1997) use the dichotomous “policy result” variable as the dependent 
variable in their logistic models by taking the value 1 when the policy result has a successful 
outcome (3 and 4 of HSE values), otherwise 0.1 They argue that the factors affecting the 
success of economic sanctions are dependent on the goals of the sender country; therefore, 
they run different logit models with the sender’s different goals: destabilization and all other 
goals of the sender country, respectively. They summarize their findings as follows: first, 
when the sender’s goal is simply destabilization, the main determinant of success is the target 
conditions. Second, for all other goals, the use of financial sanctions is the most effective, 
while there is a modest downward trend over time in the effectiveness of sanctions of this 
category. 
Three other influential cases of research on this topic are Coercive Cooperation: 
Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions by Martin (1992), Economic Statecraft by 
Baldwin (1985), and Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered by Drury (1998). First of 
all, Martin seeks to answer the question regarding the cooperation among senders while 
imposing economic sanctions. She argues that such cooperation in sanctions cases has two 
                                                          
1 Their dependent variable (the dichotomous “policy result” variable) is different from that of HSE (the 
continuous “success score” variable) and that of Bergeijk (1989, the dichotomous “success score” 
variable). 




links to the question of the sanctions’ effectiveness: “a successful sanctions effort usually 
requires cooperation among the target state’s trading partners” and “governments take into 
account the probability that sanctions will be effective when deciding whether to impose 
them” (1992, 6). She tests her hypotheses using three different statistical methods with three 
different dependent variables of the cooperation among senders. First, she uses the OLS 
regression method with the continuous dependent variable that measures the level of 
cooperation among senders; second, she uses the ordered-probit estimation method with the 
ordinal dependent variable that measures cooperation on a four-point scale; finally, she uses 
an event-count analysis with the dependent variable that is measured by the number of 
countries imposing a sanction. Her general findings using the quantitative models are the 
statistical significance of such independent variables as “target condition,” “international 
assistance to target,” “cost to sender,” and “participation of institution” in the assessment of 
the cooperation in each sanctions case. In his book Economic Statecraft, Baldwin argues that 
economic sanctions cannot be analyzed in isolation but must be compared to the costs and 
benefits of other potential state actions (1985). In spite of the usual high cost of the sender 
country, he argues that sanctions appear to have more usefulness than is commonly attributed 
to them. Finally, Drury (1998) revisits the analysis in HSE’s Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered and argues that there are problems with their empirical analysis that 
significantly affect HSE’s recommendations. Using the ordered-logit method with the 
dichotomous “policy result” dependent variable, he finds that cooperation has only a 
negative effect on success when international organizations are not involved, and that nations 
trying to subvert the sanctions only succeed when the target is originally dependent on the 
sender for its imports. 
As Martin (1992) correctly points out, a substantial amount of research has been focused 
on a few important sanction cases regarding this topic using  case studies. Among others, the 
League of Nations’ sanctions against Italy in 1935-36, the sanctions against both Rhodesia 
(1965-79) and South Africa (1962-), and the US grain embargo against the USSR in 1980 are 
some of the cases that have generated researchers’ interest (Galtung 1967; Nossal 1989). 
Recently, more interesting research has been conducted on this topic. By examining the 
sanctions cases in the 1990s, Bergeijk argues, “[the] fact that the role of the UN and the other 
international organizations has become more important, increases the potential scope of non-
violent approaches to diplomatic conflict resolution, such as sanctions, arbitrage, and 
financial compensation” (1995, 443-444). In his interesting article, titled “Sanctions at Bay,” 
Rodman (1995) argues that his historical case studies of the US sanctions against Nicaragua 
(1981-), Libya (1978-), South Africa (1985-), confirm the hegemonic decline model. He 
asserts that since the failure of the US sanctions effort against the Soviet-European gas 




3. ANALYSIS OF THE SUCCESS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
 
3.1. General Approach 
 
Even though there have been several empirical analyses focused on sanctions success, 
HSE (1990) provide the benchmark for data analyses on sanctions success. My sanctions 
success model setup focuses on the original HSE analyses and the Drury (1998) revised 
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model (see also Cox and Drury 2006), which have been regarded as fully specified models 
on sanctions success. I base my analysis on their sanctions success model to facilitate 
comparison with previous research. However, I performed a set of sensitivity analyses to 
determine the robustness of the results (e.g., varying the models by adding or dropping some 
of the control variables), and the overall pattern with this sensitivity test confirms my 
findings. Equation 1 summarizes the set of hypotheses on the success of economic sanctions 
that are tested below: 
 
Success of Economic Sanctions,
t 
= ß0 + ß1*Sanction against Human Rights,
t 
+ ß2*US as a 
Leading Sender,
t
 + ß3*US Hegemony,
t 
+ ß4*US as a Leading Sender*US Hegemony,
t
 + 
ß5*UK as a Leading Sender,
t 
+ ß6*Democracy Level of Sender,
t 
+ ß7*Democracy Level of 
Target,
t 
+ ß8*Democracy Level of Sender*Democracy Level of Target,
t 
+ ß9~ ß19*Other 
Control Variables,
t




Now, I turn to the list of hypotheses to be tested in this study, which is sorted into six 
categories, namely the hypotheses related with “time,” “type,” “hegemonic decline theory,” 
“sender,” “target,” “relationships between sender and target,” and “democratic peace 
theory.” This section provides details on the main hypotheses tested in this study, while the 
details of the other control variables in the model are explained in Appendix A (see also Kim 
2007).  
The first hypothesis is related to the “type” of economic sanction. 
 
Hypothesis (type) 1. Sanctions against human rights violations in the target have a lower 
probability of success. 
 
An important hypothesis missing from previous research on the topic would be whether 
sanctions against the target’s violations of human rights are less successful. My hypothesis is 
important because this type of sanction has been imposed more frequently in recent years; in 
fact, the data from HSE show that 17 out of 18 sanction cases of this type have been imposed 
since 1973 (some of the recent cases are the US and UK against Somalia in 1988, the US 
against Sudan in 1989, and the US against China in 1989). The theoretical reasons for the 
relative ineffectiveness of this sanction type must be twofold. First, the goals of the sender in 
this type of sanction tend to be more symbolic than others; for example, in response to its 
citizens’ moral concerns, the US frequently tends to impose symbolic economic sanctions 
against human rights violations by small Third World countries, such as Sudan, Somalia, 
Burma, and Haiti. Second, challenges to the target’s internal behavior (e.g., human rights 
abuses) compared to those of its external behavior (e.g., attacking a neighbor) are more likely 
to be viewed as attacks on the target’s sovereignty. 
The next three hypotheses are related to the “hegemonic decline theory,” which has not 
been applied to the empirical research on economic sanctions. 
 
Hypothesis (hegemonic decline model) 2. Sanctions by the US as a leading sender have 
a higher probability of success. 
 




Even though there has been no previous research that tests this theory on this topic, it 
remains an important question regarding the success of sanctions because the US has 
imposed the largest proportion of sanctions cases. Bergeijk (1989) seems to have this 
hypothesis in mind when he tries to determine the effect of the sender’s reputation on the 
success of sanctions cases as measured by the sender’s previous sanctions over a period of 10 
years. The result of a positive coefficient and the statistical significance of this variable in his 
model implies that US sanctions should have the higher probability of success. According to 
the next hypothesis, however, there should be mixed results between the US sanctions before 
the US decline of hegemony and those after. 
 
Hypothesis (hegemonic decline model) 3. There is a downward trend in the success of 
sanctions after the decline of the US hegemony. 
 
Some have argued in support of this hypothesis (HSE 1990; Rodman 1995); however, the 
reasoning used in arguments is somewhat different from this study. By splitting sample cases 
into those initiated before 1973 and those after 1973, HSE (1990) find that the success rate of 
the pre-1973 cases was higher than that of the post-1973 cases. They explain this result 
relative to declining hegemony of the US—the “Nixon shock” and the end of Bretton Woods 
system in 1973—which has been the leading sender in many sanctions cases. However, I 
argue that simply comparing the two rates of success without accounting for other control 
variables in a multivariate setting cannot show any significant evidence to support their 
argument. Rodman also argues that the US hegemonic decline regarding the success of 
sanctions cases has been shown more clearly after the failure of the US sanctions against the 
Soviet-European gas pipeline in 1980. 
 
Hypothesis (hegemonic decline model) 4. Sanctions by the US as a leading sender after 
the decline of its hegemony have a lower probability of success. 
 
This hypothesis is introduced to test the interaction effect of hypotheses 2 and 3 above. I 
argue that sanctions imposed after 1973 are less likely to succeed because of the declining 
power of the US, which has been the leading sender of many economic sanctions. This 
argument derives essentially from the previous research on the “hegemonic decline theory” 
in the field of international relations. 
The next hypothesis is related to the “sender” perspective in economic sanctions. 
 
Hypothesis (sender) 5. Sanctions by the UK as a leading sender have a higher 
probability of success. 
 
Besides the US (78 cases), the UK has been another leading sender of economic 
sanctions throughout history. Except for the USSR (7 cases), no leading sender has imposed 
sanctions more than 5 times. Notably, as a leading sender, the UK has imposed 13 cases of 
economic sanctions. Therefore, it is an interesting question to ask whether sanctions 
sponsored by the UK have met with different results in terms of their success and, if so, what 
the reasoning is for the success. Martin (1992) argues that the leading sender must 
demonstrate a credible commitment to the threats for the success of its sanction. Bergeijk 
(1989) and Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff (1997) argue that the more often the same 
state imposes sanctions, the less credible that country’s commitment or seriousness appears 
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to the target nations. I argue that this leads to the relative effectiveness of sanctions imposed 
by the UK compared to those by the US (the two leading sanction imposers). The UK, which 
not only has sufficient power to impose effective sanctions (like the US) but also can 
demonstrate credibility for the sanctions by sending a clear message to the target countries 
(unlike the US), can make its sanctions more effective. The argument is also substantiated by 
five principles in practicing UK sanctions (the Authority of the House of Lords 2007): hit the 
regime rather than people; have exemptions that minimize the humanitarian impact on 
civilians; have clear objectives and exit strategies; have an effective arrangement for 
implementation and enforcement; avoid unnecessary impact on UK economic interests. The 
sufficient power to impose sanctions with credible commitments combined with careful 
selection of issues and policies over which to implement sanctions leads to the relative 
effectiveness of UK-led sanctions compared to sanctions imposed by other states (including 
the US).     
The final set of three hypotheses is related to the “democratic peace theory,” which has 
not been applied to empirical research on economic sanctions. 
 
Hypothesis (democratic peace theory) 6. The more democratic the sender, the higher the 
probability of success. 
Hypothesis (democratic peace theory) 7. The more democratic the target, the higher the 
probability of success. 
Hypothesis (democratic peace theory) 8. Sanctions by democratic senders against 
democratic targets are more likely to succeed than otherwise. 
 
As HSE argues, a democratic state is “far more susceptible to sanction than authoritarian 
countries isolated from world opinion” because “the elite [in a democratic state] cares what 
the rest of the world thinks” (1998, 4). Following the “perpetual peace” argument by 
Immanuel Kant (1970), scholars in the camp of “democratic peace” have examined the 
relationship between democracy and peace. The main research topics in this camp have been 
the role of democratic norms and institutions on militarized conflicts; however, that focus 
has been expanded to include the economic conflicts among countries. For example, 
Reinhardt (1999) and Bush (2000) posit that the arguments of “democratic peace” can be 
applied to the economic disputes between states to study empirically the impact of 
democracy on GATT disputes and trade disputes, respectively. There will be two theoretical 
arguments in which the arguments of “democratic peace” apply to the outcomes of economic 
sanctions. First, the institutional argument of “democratic peace” can be applied to the 
success of economic sanctions initiated by democratic countries. Economic sanctions impose 
political costs on a leader’s winning coalition. Desiring to retain political office, leaders in 
democratic states, unlike those in nondemocratic states, respond to the demands of their 
relatively large winning coalitions. This greater accountability means that democratic leaders 
place a higher priority on successful public policies, including policies regarding economic 
sanctions (Hart 2000; Lektzian and Souva 2007). Because of this, leaders in democracies are 
very careful when pursuing policies regarding economic sanctions, which leads to the 
relative effectiveness of the sanctions imposed by democratic states (see also Siverson 1996). 
Second, the audience cost argument of “democratic peace” can be applied to the successful 
outcome of sanctions initiated by democracies. Economic sanctions by democratic states will 
be more successful than those by nondemocratic senders because they generate potential 
audience costs (Hart 2000; Lektzian and Souva 2007). The audience cost plays a role in 




conveying a state's intention to the other party in an economic dispute. Democracies that 
usually have stronger audience costs due to their higher structural (i.e., institutional) 
constraints compared to nondemocracies, are able to signal their true intentions concerning 
their policies on economic sanctions more credibly and clearly than nondemocracies (see 
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, Fearon 1994). In other words, democracies are very 
credible in their threats related to economic sanctions, and this credible signal of resolve 
leads to more successful outcomes of sanctions imposed by democratic states compared to 
those instituted by nondemocracies. Therefore, I hypothesize that a sanction aimed at a 
democratic target is more likely to succeed than one aimed toward an autocratic state. I also 
hypothesize that a sanction by a democratic sender is more likely to succeed and that there is 
an interaction effect among the two factors—a sanction by a democratic sender against a 
democratic target is more likely to succeed than otherwise.   
 
3.3. Research Design 
 
The data to be used in this empirical chapter are from international economic sanctions 
cases from HSE’s collection of each sanction’s episodes2. Even though there has been some 
criticism about the data they collected, not only has this data collection been used widely in 
the study of this topic to date but it is “the only existing data base” for the quantitative study 
of economic sanctions (Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997). I test a large set of 
hypotheses using the logistic estimation. I also try to determine the marginal effects of each 
independent variable in my empirical model to derive the substantive meanings of each 
hypothesis. 
 
3.4. Dependent Variable: “Policy Result”  
 
I use a dichotomous dependent variable to indicate the policy result. HSE (1990) assessed 
both the “policy result” (that measures “the extent to which the outcome sought by the sender 
was in fact achieved”) and the “sanctions contribution” (that measures “the extent to which 
the sanctions contributed to a positive result,” 1990, 41). Then, the two measurements, which 
have ordinal values between 1 and 4, are multiplied to obtain their “success score” dependent 
variable. However, some problems have been noticed with this procedure. As Dashti-Gibson, 
                                                          
2  The sanction episodes by HSE (1990, 2) are described as “the deliberate, government inspired 
withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial resources,” where foreign policy 
goals “encompass changes expressly and purportedly sought by the sender state in the political 
behavior of the target state.” For the participants in a sanction episode, the term “sender” designates 
the country (or international organization) that is “the principal author of the sanction episode” (35) 
and “target” designates the country that is “the immediate object of the episode” (36). However, some 
scholars use different definitions of sanctions in their studies: Miers and Morgan (2002) define 
sanction as an “action that one or more countries take to limit or end their economic relations with a 
target country in an effort to persuade that country to change its policies” (117); Blanchard, Mansfield, 
and Ripsman (2000, 3) define sanction as an action “taken by one state—the sender—to interfere with 
the economy of another state—the target—for the purpose of coercing its compliance with the 
sender’s wishes.” Drezner (2003) uses the terms “economic sanctions,” “economic coercion,” and 
“economic statecraft” interchangeably, but Baldwin (1985) provides the rationale to differentiate 
among those terms. 
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Davis, and Radcliff (1997, 611) point out, there is a reliability problem with the HSE 
measurements of both “policy result” and “sanctions contribution”. In addition, Dashti-
Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff (1997, 611) and Bergeijk (1989) argue that there is “no 
theoretical, empirical, or statistical reason for the policy outcome to be multiplied by another 
variable designed to assess the contribution of sanctions to the observed result.” To 
overcome some of these problems, following the convention of empirical studies on 
sanctions, I dichotomize the “policy result” variable of HSE by taking the value of 1 
(success) when there is a successful outcome (the values of 3 and 4 from HSE) and of 0 
(failure) otherwise.3 By using the dichotomous dependent variables, I expect to avoid some 
of the unreliability and ambiguity of the HSE data. 
 
3.5. Independent Variables4 
 
Sanction against Human Rights. Sometimes, the sender country imposes economic 
sanctions against the target country’s human rights violations. By using the HSE 
categorization of each sanction case and adding the three sanctions cases against South 
Africa in 1962 and 1985 and against China in 1989, if this type of sanction is imposed, it is 
coded 1, otherwise 0. According to my data set (see Appendix B: frequency distribution of 
each dichotomous variable), there have been 18 sanctions of this type.  
US as a Leading Sender. The US has been the primary sender in the history of economic 
sanctions: it has imposed 78 unilateral or joint sanctions since 1914. This variable is coded 1 
if the US initiated the sanctions either unilaterally or jointly with other countries or an 
international institution, otherwise 0. However, the unilateral sanctions by an international 
institution are not counted as 1 for this variable even though the US is one of the participants 
in that institution, such as the UN. 
US Hegemony. This variable measures whether the sanctions are imposed before or after 
the decline of the US hegemony. Sanctions imposed before 1973—the Nixon shock and the 
end of Bretton Woods system—are coded as 0, otherwise 1. Among my 116 cases, 68 
sanctions are coded 0 (before 1973) and 48 sanctions are coded 1 (after 1973). 
 US as a Leading Sender * US Hegemony. This interaction variable takes the value 
of 1 if the US initiated the sanctions either unilaterally or jointly with other countries or an 
                                                          
3 The conventional wisdom in the sanctions success study centers on the use of a “policy result” 
dependent variable by dichotomizing the four-point scale variable by HSE; in fact, HSE define 
economic sanctions as financial or trade restrictions used by a state in order to change another nation’s 
policies in some pre-specified manner (see also Drury 1998: 500). Drury (1998) argues that using a 
“sanctions contribution” (or its interaction with “policy result”) dependent variable causes redundancy 
and endogenous problems (contribution affecting some of the conventional independent variables). 
Drezner (1999) argues that “using a dependent variable that consists partially of whether sanctions 
contributed to the outcome is tautological in the extreme. The goal of the research effort is to 
determine if the dependent variables have an effect on the policy outcome. Their contribution is 
determined by the sign and significance of their coefficients in a multivariate regression. Including the 
contribution part of the dependent variable distorts the results”(68, footnote 21). Dashti-Gibson, Davis, 
and Radcliff (1997) and many others emphasize the ambiguity in the four-point scales of the HSE 
“policy result” variable and recommend using the binary version of the variable.   
4 The measurements on other control variables are presented in detail in Appendix A. 




international institution when it was in the position of hegemony (before 1973); otherwise, 0. 
87 sanctions are coded 0 and 29 sanctions are coded 1 in my data set.    
UK as a Leading Sender. This variable is coded 1 if the UK is a leading sender either 
unilaterally or jointly, otherwise 0. The same logic regarding the UK’s participation in 
international institutions’ sanctions is applied to the coding rule of this variable. There have 
been 13 sanction cases of this type. 
Democracy Level of Sender, Democracy Level of Target, and Democracy Level of Sender 
* Dummy Democracy Level of Target. These variables are obtained by using the Polity III 
dataset (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1996). First, I constructed the index by subtracting the 
autocracy index for each country in the data set from its democracy index—the final index 
ranges from -10 to 10—and this final index was rescaled from 0 to 20 for ease of 
interpretation of the statistical result (Rousseau et al. 1996, 510). The interaction term is 
composed of the sender democracy score multiplied by a dummy version of the target 
democracy score. If the latter is 17 or greater on the democracy scale, the dummy variable is 
coded 1; otherwise, it is coded 0 (Rousseau et al., 1996). Therefore, in the US sanction case 
against China in 1989, the value on the first variable (democracy level of sender: the US) is 
20, that on the second variable (democracy level of target, China) is 3, and the interaction 
term is 0 (see Appendix C: descriptive statistics of each variable). 
 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
My empirical analysis of sanctions success is based primarily on two statistical 
procedures. First, with the “policy result” dichotomous dependent variables,5 I provide the 
results from my logit estimation6 to show the statistical meanings of each of my hypotheses 
(see Table 1). Then, I pay close attention to the substantive meanings of each of my 
hypotheses by calculating the marginal effects of each independent variable in my model 
(see Table 2). This is because the statistical results can have more reasonable significance 
when they are combined with the substantive consideration. The results in Table 2 of 
marginal effects show the probability of success of economic sanctions and the change in 
probability related to each of my independent variables, holding all other variables in their 
means or modes. 
The first set of results to be discussed is those for the variables related with “time” and 
“type.” The hypothesis on Sanction Duration predicts that the coefficient on this variable 
will be positive, and the result shows that it has the expected sign (0.0205) but fails to reach 
statistical significance in my sanction success model (p-value 0.7873). The next two 
hypotheses are related to the “type” of economic sanctions. The hypothesis on Sanction of  
                                                          
5 HSE (1990) use the “success score” dependent variable that results from multiplying their “policy 
result” variable by the “sanction contribution” variable. However, as I mentioned previously, there has 
been some criticism of their dependent variable. In my study, I use the dichotomized “policy result” 
variable as my dependent variable. I have tried to create a new kind of “success score” variable by 
adding their “policy result” and “sanction contribution” variables together; however, the Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.577 (with the inter-item correlation of 0.895) shows that the new scale adding those two 
variables is quite unreliable. 
6 The results from my logit estimation are almost identical to those from the ordered-logit estimation 
using the same set of independent variables. 
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Table 1. Multivariate Analysis of Success of Economic Sanctions 
Independent Variables Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Sanction Duration 
Sanction of Financial Type 
Sanction against Human Rights 
US as a Leading Sender 
US Hegemony 
US as a Leading Sender * US Hegemony  
UK as a Leading Sender    
International Institution as a Leading Sender    
International Cooperation for Sender 
International Institution as a Leading Sender * 
     International Cooperation for Sender 
Cost to Sender 
International Assistance to Target 
Target Conditions 
Cost to Target 
Presanction Relations between Sender and Target    
Economic Difference 
Democracy Level of Sender 
Democracy Level of Target 
Democracy Level of Sender * Dummy Democracy Level of Target 
Constant 
N 
-2 Log Likelihood 
Chi-Square 
% Correct 
0.0205  (0.0377) 
0.8213  (0.7012) 
-1.7233*  (0.8635) 
-1.1211  (0.9875) 
1.0987  (1.3734) 
-1.1053  (1.5644) 
1.3246  (0.9649) 
0.6039  (0.9956) 
-0.8951*  (0.4331) 
0.5278  (0.3600) 
 
-0.8565+  (0.4527) 
0.5849  (0.7786) 
-0.2256  (0.4670) 
0.4410+  (0.2421) 
0.8093  (0.5003) 
-0.0010  (0.0010) 
0.1458+  (0.0828) 
0.0437  (0.0616) 
-0.0758  (0.0689) 





Note: All significance tests are one-tailed; +p <= .10, *p <= .05, **p <= .01 
 
Financial Type predicts that the coefficient on this variable will be positive and the result 
shows that it has the expected sign (0.8231) but fails to reach statistical significance in my 
model. Next, my hypothesis on Sanction against Human Rights predicts that the coefficient 
on this variable will be negative, and my result shows that it is strongly negative (-1.7233) 
and statistically significant at better than the 0.05 level. The results from marginal effects 
also illustrate the relative importance of this variable: the predicted probability of success 
decreases 29 percentage points by changing the value of this variable from 0 (a sanction not 
related with human rights) to 1 (a sanction against human rights). These results, with both 
logit estimation and marginal effects analyses, show that sanctions against the target 
country’s human rights violations clearly have more difficulty succeeding than otherwise. 
The next three of my hypotheses are related to the “hegemonic decline theory.” These 
hypotheses argue that sanctions by the US after its declining hegemony will be less likely to 
succeed than otherwise. The results do not support this argument: any of all three coefficients 
on their variables fails to achieve statistical significance and, more importantly, the 
interaction term has the unexpected sign (-1.1053).7 The result from the marginal effects  
                                                          
7 Accepting Wallerstein’s (1983) argument that US hegemony ended in 1967 instead of 1973 does not 
change any of the results in my analysis.  




Table 2. Marginal Effects on Success of Economic Sanctions 
 
Probability 
Percentage Point Change 
from Value Above 
Sanction against Human Rights 
No 
Yes 






US as a Leading Sender * US Hegemony 
0 
1 
UK as a Leading Sender 
No 
Yes 
International Cooperation for Sender 
1.97 (Mean) 
3.05 (One Standard Deviation) 
4.00 (Maximum) 
Total Change 
International Institution as a Leading Sender * 
International Cooperation for Sender 
0.90 (Mean) 
2.32 (One Standard Deviation) 
3.74 (Two Standard Deviations) 
Total Change 
Cost to Sender 
1.90 (Mean) 
2.73 (One Standard Deviation) 
3.56 (Two Standard Deviations) 
Total Change 
Cost to Target 
1.83 (Mean) 
6.96 (One Standard Deviation) 
12.09 (Two Standard Deviations) 
Total Change 
Presanction Relations between Sender and Target 
2.13 (Mean) 
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6749.16 (Two Standard Deviations) 
Total Change 










Democracy Level of Sender * 









































Note: The marginal analysis calculates the change in the predicted probability of sanctions success for 
an X unit change in the independent variable of interest (while holding all other independent 
variables at their means or modes). 
 
 
analysis also confirms those from the logit estimation: the predicted probability of success 
decreases 13 percentage points by changing the value of the interaction variable from 0 (a 
sanction by the US after its hegemonic decline) to 1 (a sanction by the US when it was in the 
hegemonic position). Next, the results regarding my own hypothesis on UK as a Leading 
Sender show that sanctions enacted by the UK are indeed more likely to succeed than 
otherwise. Even though it falls short of the conventional thresholds of statistical significance 
(p-value 0.1698), the result from the marginal effects analysis shows that the predicted 
probability of success increases 27 percentage points by changing the value of this variable 
from 0 (a sanction not by the UK as a leading sender) to 1 (a sanction by the UK as a leading 
sender).  
The next three hypotheses are tested to replicate Drury’s (1998) findings. Based on his 
observations that international cooperation with the sender has only a negative effect on 
success when international institutions are not involved, these hypotheses predict that the 
coefficient on International Cooperation to Sender will be negative (and statistically 
significant) and that on the interaction term will be positive (and statistically significant). My 
results from the logit model support his findings: the coefficient on the cooperation variable 
is solidly negative (-0.8951) and statistically significant at better than the 0.05 level, and that 
on the interaction term is slightly positive and falls just short of conventional thresholds of 
statistical significance (p-value 0.1426). The results from the marginal effects analysis also 
confirm his findings: changing the value of the cooperation variable from its mean (1.97) to 
its maximum (4.00) decreases the predicted probability of success by 28 percentage points, 
and changing the value of the interaction term from its mean (0.90) to two standard 
deviations above its mean (3.74) increases the predicted probability by 31 percentage points. 
Another hypothesis related with “sender” is that on Cost to Sender. This hypothesis predicts 




that the coefficient on this variable will be negative, and my results support this hypothesis. 
The coefficient on this variable is solidly negative (-0.8565) and statistically significant at 
the 0.10 level (p-value 0.0585).8 Changing the value of this variable from its mean (1.90) to 
two standard deviations above its mean (3.56) decreases its predicted probability of success 
by 25 percentage points. The results from these four hypotheses show that sanctions are less 
likely to succeed than otherwise when international cooperation increases in the absence of 
the participation of international institutions and when cost to sender is relatively large. 
Three hypotheses related with “target” predict that the coefficients on both International 
Assistance to Target and Target Conditions will be negative, and that the coefficient on Cost 
to Target will be positive. First, the coefficient on the international assistance variable has 
the unexpected positive sign (0.5849) and that on the target condition variable has the 
expected negative sign (-0.2256); however, both of them fail to achieve statistical 
significance (p-values 0.4525 and 0.6289, respectively), which makes the results received 
from the logit model somewhat dubious. Second, the coefficient on the target cost variable is 
slightly positive (0.4410) and statistically significant at better than the 0.10 level. The result 
from the marginal effects analysis also confirms the significance of this last factor: the 
predicted probability of success increased by 49 percentage points by changing its value 
from 1.83 (mean) to 12.09 (two standard deviations above its mean). These results show that 
the only important factor related with “target” is the cost to target: the higher the cost to 
target, the higher the probability of success. The next two factors are related with the 
“relationships between sender and target.” Both hypotheses on Presanction Relations 
between Sender and Target and Economic Difference predict the positive sign of its 
coefficient. First, the coefficient on the presanction relations variable has the expected 
positive sign (0.8093) and falls just short of the conventional thresholds of statistical 
significance, and the result from marginal effects also shows the significance of this factor: 
slightly changing its value from 2.13 (mean) to 3.00 (maximum) increases the predicted 
probability of success by 15 percentage points. These results confirm the argument that 
sanctions are more likely to succeed when the sender has a cordial relationship with the 
target. Next, the coefficient on Economic Difference is unexpectedly negative (-0.0010) but 
fails to achieve statistical significance.9 
                                                          
8 I transformed all of my categorical independent variables into dichotomous variables and ran my logit 
model again. The dichotomous Cost to Sender variable takes the new values of 0, when a sanction 
was “net gain to sender” (HSE value of 1) and 1, when a sanction was either “little effect on sender” 
or “modest or major loss to sender” (the original values of 2, 3, and 4). The dichotomous International 
Cooperation for Sender variable takes the new values of 0, when there was “no or minor cooperation” 
(the original values of 1 and 2) and of 1, when there was “modest or significant cooperation” (the 
original values of 3 and 4). The dichotomous Target Conditions variable takes the new values of 0, 
when either target was “distressful” or had “significant problems” (the original values of 1 and 2, 
respectively) and of 1, when it was “strong and stable” (the original value of 3). Finally, the 
dichotomous Presanction Relations between Sender and Target variable takes the new values of 0, 
when the prior relations were “antagonistic” or “neutral” (the original values of 1 and 2, respectively) 
and of 1, when they were “cordial” (the original value of 3). Using these dummy variables instead of 
the original categorical variables does not change any results in my analysis.  
9 The normality tests of this and five other independent variables—Sanction Duration, Cost to Target, 
Democracy Level of Sender, Democracy Level of Target, and Democracy Level of Sender * Dummy 
Democracy Level of Target—show that the ratios of both skewness and kurtosis to its standard error 
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Finally, the next three of my hypotheses are related with the “democratic peace theory.” 
These hypotheses predict that the coefficients on all of their variables will be positive. My 
results support only part of the argument from those hypotheses. The coefficients on both 
Democracy Level of Sender and Democracy Level of Target have the expected positive signs 
(0.1458 and 0.0437, respectively) and that on the former variable is statistically significant at 
the 0.10 level. The result from marginal effects also supports the significance of this factor: 
by changing its value from 1 (a fully autocratic sender) to 20 (a fully democratic sender), the 
predicted probability of success increases by 41 percentage points. However, not only does 
the coefficient on the latter variable fail to achieve statistical significance (p-value 0.4785), 
but that on Democracy Level of Sender * Dummy Democracy Level of Target is 
unexpectedly negative (-0.0758) and statistically insignificant (p-value 0.2712). Given this 
set of findings, I conclude that the democratic regime type of sender has a positive impact on 
the success of sanctions, but that of the target does not have any clear impact on the success 





My empirical investigation identifies a number of explanatory variables as determinants 
of the success and failure of international economic sanctions. These general findings are 
derived by using both the logistic estimation method and the marginal effects analysis of the 
dichotomous “policy result” dependent variable. The bivariate analysis also generally 
confirms my findings (see Appendix D). My investigation of the violations of assumptions of 
the statistical model shows that there are no cases of multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, 
and autocorrelation in my model, which therefore confirms the robustness of my empirical 
findings (see Appendix E-1, E-2, & E-3). Finally, my use of dichotomous independent 
variables rather than ordinal variables also generally confirms my findings (see footnote 6).   
My findings related with the “time,” “type,” and “hegemonic decline model” suggest 
three important arguments. First of all, unlike the arguments posited by many researchers, 
sanction duration and financial type do not have much impact on the success of economic 
sanctions; rather, the important finding is the relative ineffectiveness of sanctions imposed as 
a result of the human rights abuses of the target country. This has been one of the missing 
parts in the study of economic sanctions. This finding was revealed clearly by using both the 
logistic estimation method and a marginal effects analysis: the statistical significance of this 
variable is at better than the 0.05 level, and there is a decline of the predicted probability by 
29 percentage points when this type of sanction is imposed. Sender countries of this sanction 
type usually have imprecise symbolic goals regarding its imposed sanctions while target 
countries of this type are more antagonistic against imposed sanctions because they feel the 
                                                          
are less than –2 or greater than 2 in those variables. These results show the skewness of the 
distribution of these independent variables. In order to induce the normal distribution of these 
variables, I transformed the variables into the logarithmic forms of variables by taking their natural 
logs. All results in my analysis were held except that on Economic Difference. The logarithmic form 
of this variable has reached statistical significance at the 0.05 level. The original result from marginal 
effects also supports this new finding: changing its value from 568.64 (mean) to 6749.16 (two 
standard deviations above its mean) yields a 39 percentage point decrease in the predicted probability 
of success.   




senders are interfering with their sovereignty. Clearly, Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 
(1997) are right when they argue that sanctions are not always designed specifically to 
succeed and that, if the actual goals are purely symbolic or expressive, they can hardly 
succeed in their true goals. However the hypothesis that economic sanctions have become 
less effective after the US hegemonic decline fails to achieve any statistical confirmation. 
Next, relative to the “sender” of sanctions, I first confirm the findings of Drury (1998) 
that international cooperation with the sender only has a negative impact on success when 
international institutions are not involved. Two other important findings related with the 
“sender” are, first, a sanction is more likely to succeed when it is imposed by the UK. The 
relative effectiveness of sanctions imposed by the UK is related primarily with the credibility 
of the sender country. As both Bergeijk (1989) and Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 
(1997) argue correctly, the more often the same state imposes sanctions, the less credible that 
country’s commitment or seriousness appears to the target nations. The UK, which not only 
has sufficient power to impose effective sanctions (like the US) but can also demonstrate 
credibility for the sanctions by sending a clear message to the target countries (unlike the 
US), can make its sanctions more effective. The sufficient power to impose sanctions with 
credible commitments combined with careful selection of issues and policies over which to 
implement sanctions leads to the relative effectiveness of UK-led sanctions compared to 
sanctions imposed by other states (including the US). This finding shows the importance of 
the UK as a leading sender, which has been paid little attention to by previous researchers on 
this topic. Second, the findings show that sanctions are more likely to succeed when cost to 
the sender country is relatively large − this confirms the empirical findings of most of the 
previous research. With regard to the “target” and the “regime type” of sender and target of 
sanctions, first, my findings confirm the previous research regarding the cost to target: the 
higher the probability that an economic sanction succeeds, the higher the cost is to the target. 
Finally, my findings related with the regime type provide evidence to support the 
“democratic peace theory”: the democratic regime type of sender has a positive impact, but 
that of the target does not have any clear impact. Leaders in democracies are very careful 
when pursuing policies regarding economic sanctions, which leads to the relative 
effectiveness of the sanctions imposed by democratic states. Democracies are also very 
credible in their threats related to economic sanctions, and this credible signal of resolve 
leads to more successful outcomes of sanctions imposed by democratic states compared to 
those instituted by nondemocracies. 
There has been a lack of systemic empirical studies on conditions that consider which 
type of economic sanctions are most likely to succeed, compared to the large volume of 
research devoted to qualitative case studies or purely theoretical, deductive models  for the 
study of economic sanctions. The main purpose of this study is to rigorously test a set of 
hypotheses regarding the conditions for the success of economic sanctions. The set of 
generalizable findings revealed from this study will be useful for researchers, whose main 
objective is to find the determinants of success of economic sanctions, and policy makers, 
whose main policy objective is to increase the effectiveness of their sanctions policies. For 
researchers, my findings will show the usefulness of quantitative methods on this topic, 
which have not been used frequently, while for policy makers, the findings will illustrate the 
conditions necessary to increase the probability of success for the imposed sanctions as one 
of their important foreign policy tools.   
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Appendix A. Additional Hypotheses and Measurements for the Sanctions Success  




The Hypotheses Regarding the Time and Type of Sanction 
The first two hypotheses are related to the “time” and “type” of economic sanctions.  
 
Hypothesis (Time) 9. The longer the duration of sanctions, the higher the probability of 
success. 
 
There has been some controversy regarding the duration of sanctions and their success. 
Some argue that lengthier sanctions increase the probability of success because “sanctions 
may take time to take effect, and, therefore, the longer they are in force, the greater the 
disutility experienced by the target” (Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997: 609). 
However, others argue that extended sanctions appear less successful because if sanctions 
have been successful, they do not need to be continued; senders are reluctant to give up their 
sanctions even after noticing their failure; and “sending states are not capable of maintaining 
indefinitely the necessary international solidarity” (609-610). This latter argument has been 
proven empirically in some analyses: both Bergeijk (1989) and Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and 
Radcliff (1997) find the negative sign and statistical significance of the duration variable in 
their models, and HSE (1985) also find the negative sign, but not significance in their model.  
 
Hypothesis (Type) 10. Compared to the common import/export restrictions, financial 
sanctions (e.g., freezing assets in the target) have a higher probability of success. 
 
Unlike the sanctions to use import/export restrictions that often affect the general 
population but leave the elites untouched, the financial sanctions, by making “a more direct 
and immediate impact on ruling elites by limiting their access to foreign currency,” appear 
more successful in general (Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997: 610). However, HSE 
(1985) do not find any evidence for this hypothesis: all dummy variables of import, export, 
and financial types do not achieve statistical significance in their model, and, furthermore, 
the variable of the financial type has the negative sign in their model, which means that 
financial sanctions tend to be less rather than more successful. 
 
The Hypotheses Regarding the Sender of Sanctions 
The next four hypotheses are related to the “sender” of economic sanctions.  
 
Hypothesis (Sender) 11. Sanctions by an international institution as a leading sender 
have a higher probability of success. 
Hypothesis (Sender) 12. The greater the international cooperation with the sender, the 
lower the probability of success. 
Hypothesis (Sender) 13. The greater the international cooperation for sanctions by 
international institutions, the lower the probability of success. 
 
This set of hypotheses is one of the main controversies in the determinants of sanction 
success (the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions vs. unilateral sanctions, as well as that of 




sanctions by international institutions). First, policy makers believe generally that 
multilateral sanctions are more likely to be effective; however, empirical research on 
sanctions success has found otherwise. HSE argue that sanctions are less likely to be 
effective if a greater number of states is needed to implement the denial measures (1990, 89). 
However, for Martin (1992) and other researchers, international cooperation to impose 
sanctions is the most important factor in determining the effectiveness of such sanctions. For 
example, Martin argues that “sanctions cannot work if they are unilateral” and that 
“cooperation is one step removed from success, a necessary if not sufficient precondition” 
(1992, 6). Another important determinant of sanction success would be sanctions by 
international institutions, such as the League of Nations, the Arab League, and the UN, and 
there have been 24 cases of this type so far. Martin (1992) argues that “the leading sender 
has to demonstrate a credible commitment to the threats [for the success of its sanction]” and 
that one of the important mechanisms that accompany such credible commitments is the use 
of international institutions (413). By making the cooperation among other possible 
sanctioners easier and the free ride enjoyed by those countries more difficult, sanctions by 
international institutions have a higher probability of success. Drezner (2000) finds that 
without support from international institutions, the increased levels of cooperation from other 
states leads to significantly fewer concessions from the target; when there is support from 
international institutions, cooperation from other states has a positive effect on the target’s 
concessions. Drury (1998) also finds that international cooperation has a negative effect on 
sanctions success only when international institutions are not involved. 
 
Hypothesis (Sender) 14. The higher the cost to the sender, the lower the probability of 
success. 
 
HSE find that “the costs imposed on domestic firms in the sender country are generally 
higher in cases that fail than those that succeed,” and they give us one of their 
commandments regarding economic sanctions: “if you need to ask the price, you can’t afford 
the yacht” (1990, 87–8). However, as other researchers including Martin (1992) assert, 
because high-cost sanctions are related to the high credibility of the sender, they are more 
likely to succeed. By communicating the clear message to impose and continue its sanctions 
in spite of their high cost, the sender country can obtain the target country’s surrender more 
easily.  
 
The Hypotheses Regarding the Target of Sanction 
The next three hypotheses are related to the “target” of economic sanctions. 
 
Hypothesis (Target) 15. The more international assistance the target has, the lower the 
probability of success. 
Hypothesis (Target) 16. The higher the political and economic stability of the target 
before sanctions, the lower the probability of success. 
Hypothesis (Target) 17. The higher the cost to the target, the higher the probability of 
success. 
 
If the target can get international assistance, it can easily diminish the damage caused by 
the sanctions imposed. For example, if the target has an alternative source to overcome the 
export and import restrictions imposed by the sanction, the goals of senders in sanction cases 
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to dampen the target cannot easily be accomplished. For example, the US sanctions against 
Cuba—since 1960—has been understood as a failure, and many people argue that one 
important reason is the USSR’s support for the target country—“[in] 1960, the USSR 
[began] extensive program of shipping goods, extending credits to Cuba; program lasts into 
1980s” (HSE 1990: 318). HSE point out that “countries in distress or experiencing 
significant problems are far more likely to succumb to the policy objectives of the sender 
country. When specific goals are at issue, the health and stability of the target country is 
usually an important determinant in the success of the episode” (1990, 83). This is somewhat 
proved by the failures of such episodes as the US sanctions against France in 1983 over its 
nuclear weapons testing and against the USSR over its downing of a Korean Airlines plane. 
In general, a sanction tends to work if it is imposed on both politically and economically 
unstable, small target countries in the Third World. HSE also find that sanctions that put a 
heavy cost on the target are generally successful: “Sanctions that bite are sanctions that 
work” (102). 
 
The Hypotheses Regarding the Sender/Target Relationship of Sanction 
The next two hypotheses are related to the “relationships between sender and target” of 
economic sanctions.  
 
Hypothesis (Relationship) 18. The more cordial the relationship between sender and 
target before the sanction is imposed, the higher the probability of success. 
Hypothesis (Relationship) 19. The closer the prior trade relationship between the sender 
and the target, the higher the probability of success. 
 
“Attack your allies, not your adversaries” is one of the HSE (1990) commandments. A 
sanction against the target country that has long been an adversary of the sender, or has little 
trade with the sender, is generally less successful (HSE 1990: 84–86). This is because “[the] 
higher compliance with sanctions by allies and trading partners reflects their willingness to 
bend on specific issues in deference to an overall relationship with the sender country” (84). 
Bergeijk (1989) finds in his models that the trade linkage variable—defined as the sender’s 
trade flows to the target as a percentage of the target’s GNP in the year prior to the 
sanction—has the expected negative coefficient and statistical significance. Drury (1998, 
502) argues that higher trade levels lead to higher costs to the target (i.e., more damage to 
target), and this in turn leads to more effective imposed sanctions. He also argues, however, 
that when there is international assistance to a target, the positive effect of presanction levels 




The Variables Regarding Time and Type of Sanction 
Sanction Duration. To assess the impacts of the duration on the effectiveness of sanctions, 
I simply use HSE’s calculation of the sanction duration by “rounding to the nearest whole 
year, disregarding the beginning and ending month”; therefore, India’s sanctions against 
Nepal that began in March 1989 and ended in June 1990 is counted as having lasted one year. 
In the period of my study from 1914 to 1990, the mean duration of the useable 116 cases is 
6.25 years with a minimum of 1 year—e.g., the US sanctions against El Salvador in 1987—
and a maximum of 44 years—the Arab League’s sanctions against Israel since 1946. 




Sanctions of Financial Type. When the sender imposes this type of financial sanction, the 
variable is coded 1; otherwise, 0. There are 86 cases of this type in my database: these cases 
include financial only as well as financial and export/import. 
 
The Variables Regarding the Sender of Sanction 
International Institution as a leading Sender. There have been many sanctions imposed 
by diverse international institutions, such as the League of Nations, the Arab League, 
Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM), China Committee of the Paris 
Consultative Group (CHINCOM), Organization of African Unity, OECD, and the UN. In 
these cases, the variable is coded 1; otherwise, 0. There have been 24 cases of this type. 
International Cooperation for Sender. This variable measures the degree of cooperation 
for the leading sender in the sanctions episode. HSE (1990, 34–36) measure this variable 
using values of 1 (“no cooperation: a single sender country imposes sanctions and usually 
seeks no cooperation”; e.g., the US sanctions against Brazil in 1962), 2 (“minor cooperation: 
the sender country enlists verbal support and possibly token restraints from other countries”; 
e.g., the US sanctions against the USSR in 1981), 3 (“modest cooperation: the sender country 
obtains meaningful restraints—but limited in time and coverage—from some but not all the 
important trading partners of the target country”; e.g., the US sanctions against Cuba in 
1960), and 4 (“significant cooperation: the important trading partners make a major effort to 
limit trade, although linkages may still exist through neutral countries”; e.g., sanctions 
related to World Wars I and II). There have been 53, 28, 20, and 15 sanction cases, 
respectively (based on the HSE data collection). 
International Institution as a Leading Sender * International Cooperation for Sender. 
This interaction variable takes the value of 0 when international institutions were not 
involved and the values on Sender Cooperation when international institutions were involved. 
Cost to Sender. HSE (1990, 38–39) attempt to measure the cost to the sender in each 
sanctions episode. They code the sender cost using four values: 1 for “net gain to sender: 
usually cases where aid is withheld” (e.g., US sanctions against Sudan in 1989), 2 for “little 
effect on sender: cases where a trivial dislocation occurs” (e.g., US sanctions against China 
in 1989), 3 for “modest loss to sender: some trade is lost, but neither the size nor 
concentration of the loss is substantial” (e.g., US sanctions against Panama in 1987), and 4 
for “major loss to sender: large volumes of trade are adversely affected” (e.g., the US and 
UN joint sanctions against Iraq in 1990). There have been 40 “net gain,” 54 “little effect,” 16 
“modest loss,” and 6 “major loss” cases for each value, respectively. 
  
The Variables Regarding the Target of Sanction 
International Assistance to Target. This variable is dichotomous. If there was 
international assistance (overt military or economic aid) to the target, it is coded as 1; 
otherwise, 0. Among 116 sanction cases, the target could receive international assistance in 
27 cases. Recent examples are Libya’s assistance to the target in the US sanctions against 
Panama in 1987 and the USSR’s assistance in the US sanctions against Poland in 1981. 
Target Conditions. This variable is measured by assessing the overall economic health 
and political stability of the target country throughout the period of the sanctions case (HSE 
1990, 36–7). This variable has three values: 1 for “distress: a country with acute economic 
problems, exemplified by high unemployment and rampant inflation, coupled with political 
turmoil bordering on chaos” (e.g., Sudan in the US sanctions of 1989), 2 for “significant 
problems: a country with severe economic problems, such as a foreign exchange crisis, 
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coupled with substantial internal dissent” (e.g., Iraq in the US and UN joint sanctions of 
1990), and 3 for “strong and stable: a country with the government in firm control and an 
economy experiencing only the normal range of inflation, unemployment, and small ills” 
(e.g., China in the US sanctions of 1989). There have been 24 “distress,” 52 “significant 
problems,” and 40 “strong and stable” cases of each type, respectively.  
Cost to Target. This variable is measured by the annual cost of sanctions to the target as a 
percentage of its GNP. Based on the HSE collection, the mean of this variable is 1.8%; the 
minimum is -5.5% (e.g., the US sanctions against Ethiopia in 1976 where Ethiopia gained 
much more aid and loans from the USSR than it lost from the suspension of US aid and 
loans). The maximum is 48.0% (the US and U.N. joint sanctions against Iraq in 1990). 
 
The Variables Regarding the Sender/Target Relationship of Sanction  
Presanction Relations between Sender and Target. HSE (1990, 37–38) measure this 
variable of presanction relationship with three values: 1 for “antagonistic: the sender and 
target countries are in opposing camps” (e.g., the US with Syria in the 1986 sanctions 
episode); 2 for “neutral: the sender country does not have strong ties to the target,” (e.g., the 
US with Haiti in the 1987 sanctions episode); and 3 for “cordial: the sender and target 
countries are close friends and allies” (e.g., the US and the United Kingdom with Somalia in 
the 1988 sanctions episode). There have been 23, 55, and 38 of these sanction cases, 
respectively.  
Economic Difference. This variable is measured as the target’s total bilateral trade 




Appendix B. Frequency Distribution of Each Dichotomous Variable 
 
Variable Value of 0 Value of 1 
Policy Result Dichotomy 59 (50.9%) 57 (49.1%) 
Sanction of Financial Type 30 (25.9%) 86 (74.1%) 
Sanction against Human Rights 98 (84.5%) 18 (15.5%) 
US as a Leading Sender 38 (32.8%) 78 (67.2%) 
US Hegemony 68 (58.6%) 48 (41.4%) 
US as a Leading Sender * 
US Hegemony 
87 (75.0%) 29 (25.0%) 
UK as a Leading Sender 103 (88.8%) 13 (11.2%) 
International Institution as a Leading Sender 92 (79.3%) 24 (20.7%) 



















Policy Result 2.58 1.17 1 4 
Sanction Duration 6.25 8.78 1 44 
International Cooperation for Sender 1.97 1.08 1 4 
International Institution as a Leading Sender * 
International Cooperation for Sender 
0.90 1.42 0 4 
Cost to Sender 1.90 0.83 1 4 
Target Conditions 2.14 0.73 1 3 
Cost to Target 1.83 5.13 -5.50 48.00 
Presanction Relations between Sender and Target 2.13 0.72 1 3 
Economic Difference 568.64 3090.26 0.10 32900.00 
Democracy Level of Sender 16.99 6.10 1 20 
Democracy Level of Target 7.27 6.66 1 20 
Democracy Level of Sender * 
Dummy Democracy Level of Target 
2.01 5.71 0 20 
 
Appendix D. Bivariate Analysis: Statistics for the Differences of Failure and Success 
Cases with Each Independent Variable (Excluding the Dichotomous 
Independent Variables) 
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Democracy Level of Sender * 













Note: The test of mean differences of two categories (success and failure) was conducted by using the 
Independent Samples T-Test procedure. If the test result shows significance (say, at the 0.05 
level), it means that there is a statistically significant mean difference between two categories. 
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Appendix E-1. Test Results of Multicollinearity 
 
Multicollinearity refers to “the situation where there is either an exact or approximately 
exact linear relationship among the X variables” (Gujarati 1995: 345). The consequences of 
multicollinearity are as follows: “If multicollinearity is perfect…, the regression coefficients 
of the X variables are indeterminate and their standard errors are infinite. If multicollinearity 
is less than perfect…, the regression coefficients, although determinate, possess large errors 
(in relation to the coefficients themselves), which means the coefficients cannot be estimated 
with great precision or accuracy” (322). To test whether any serious multicollinearity is 
present in my equation, I ran auxiliary regressions of my each X variables on the remaining X 
variables. The results show that none of R-squares obtained from auxiliary regressions is 
more than 0.745 (i.e., none of the variation inflation factors is more than 3.922). Therefore, I 
conclude that there is no serious multicollinearity in my equation and that, consequently, 
multicollinearity cannot explain the insignificant results in any part of my analysis. 
 
 
Appendix E-2. Test Results of Heteroskedasticity 
 
Heteroskedasticity is a violation of the important assumption of the classical regression 
model, homoskedasticity, which refers to “the variation of each disturbance term ui, 
conditional on the chosen values of the explanatory variables, is some constant number equal 
to [σ-squared]” (Gujarati 1995: 355-356). In the presence of heteroskedasticity, the 
estimators are not BLUE: even though they can be unbiased and consistent, they are no 
longer of minimum variance or efficient (389). By inflating the standard errors of regression 
coefficients, heteroskedasticity can produce a situation in which it is hard to find coefficients 
that are statistically significant. Given the fact that 14 out of 19 independent variables are 
statistically insignificant, we can suspect the presence of heteroskedasticity in my equation; 
however, my test results prove this is not the case. To test whether heteroskedasticity is 
present in my equation, I used Spearman’s rank correlation test. My test results show that 
there is no sign of heteroskedasticity in my equation (t-statistic is 1.090 with 98 degrees of 
freedom from the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient of 0.109; see the detailed 
procedures of applying for this test in Gujarati 1995, 372-374). Therefore, I conclude that 
there is no heteroskedasticity in my equation and that, as a consequence, heteroskedasticity 
cannot explain the insignificant results in any element in my analysis. 
 
 
Appendix E-3. Test Results of Autocorrelation 
 
Autocorrelation (or serious correlation) is a violation of another important assumption of 
the classical regression model that “the errors or disturbances ut entering into the population 
regression model are random or uncorrelated” (Gujarati 1995: 439). Quite similar to the case 
of heteroskedasticity, in the presence of autocorrelation, the estimators are not BLUE; even 
though they can be unbiased and consistent, they are no longer of minimum variance or 
efficient. Inflating and deflating the standard errors of regression coefficients (negative and 
positive autocorrelations, respectively) can yield the situation in which the usual t tests of 
significance of our independent variables are no longer legitimate (439). To test whether 
autocorrelation is present in my equation, I first took looked at the plot of residuals against a  

























time variable (the sanction beginning year variable). The plot does not show any systematic 
pattern, which means that there might be no autocorrelation in my equation (see the below 
Figure 1). 
I conducted the so-called runs test (the Geary test) to ensure the graphical evidence of no 
autocorrelation. My test results show that I cannot reject the null hypothesis of randomness 
(i.e., the absence of autocorrelation) with 99% confidence (with total number of observations 
of 100, number of + residuals of 48, number of - residuals of 52, and the number of runs of 
51; see the detailed procedures for applying this test in Gujarati 1995, 419-420). Therefore, I 
conclude that there is no autocorrelation in my equation; consequently, autocorrelation 
cannot explain any significant or insignificant results in my analysis. 
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